We consider two versions of a Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric costs and homogeneous goods. They differ in whether predatory pricing is allowed. For each version, we derive the Myopic Stable Set in pure strategies as introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017). We contrast our prediction to the prediction of Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Introduction
The analysis of price competition is a fundamental part of oligopoly theory since Bertrand's contribution (Bertrand, 1883) . The Bertrand duopoly with symmetric constant marginal costs, homogeneous goods and continuous prices has a unique Nash Equilibrium characterized by a strategy profile in which prices equal marginal costs.
If marginal costs are not symmetric across firms and the market is shared if firms set equal prices, no pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Blume (2003) shows that there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where the more efficient firm sets price equal to the opponent's marginal cost and serves the entire market with probability 1. The rival randomizes uniformly on an interval above his marginal cost. Kartik (2011) strengthens this result by showing that all undominated equilibria have the same outcome in terms of market price and shares. When dominated strategies are allowed, no such result is known.
In this paper, we analyze two versions of the same Bertrand game, one in which predatory pricing (i.e. setting prices below marginal costs) is allowed and one in which predatory pricing is forbidden. Predatory prices correspond to dominated strategies. We use a solution concept recently introduced by Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017) , the Myopic Stable Set. A set of strategy profiles is myopically stable if it satisfies three conditions, deterrence of external deviations, asymptotic external stability and minimality. Deterrence of external deviations requires that no player benefits by switching her strategy such that the resulting strategy profile is outside the Myopic Stable Set. Asymptotic external stability makes sure that from any strategy profile outside the set it is possible to get arbitrarily close to a strategy profile inside the Myopic Stable Set by a sequence of better replies. The final condition, minimality, requires that the Myopic Stable Set is minimal with respect to set inclusion.
In Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017) we defined the Myopic Stable Set for a very general class of social environments (Chwe, 1994) that allows for infinite state spaces and includes normal-form games as a special case. We proved that if the state space is compact then the myopic stable set exists and under some mild continuity assumptions it is also unique. Moreover, we showed that the Myopic Stable Set coincides with the set of pure strategy Nash Equilibria for supermodular games, aggregative games and potential games.
In light of these results, the Bertrand model with asymmetric costs is interesting for several reasons: it does not satisfy the compactness and continuity assumptions of Demuynck, Herings, Saulle, and Seel (2017) , it does not belong to any of the aforementioned classes of games and the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria of this game is empty.
We prove existence and uniqueness of the Myopic Stable Set for asymmetric Bertrand competition and characterize the set, both when predatory pricing is allowed and when it is forbidden.
Model and Solution Concept
In this section, we define the myopic stable set for normal-form games G : pN, pS i q iN , pπ i q iN q, where N t1, ..., nu is a finite set of players with typical element i, S i is the set of strategies for each player i N and π i : Definition 2 (Asymptotic Dominance). A strategy profile s V S asymptotically dominates s S if for all ε ¡ 0 there exists s I f N psq such that dps V , s I q ε.
We denote the set of all strategy profiles in S that asymptotically dominate s by f V psq.
Formally,
It is easy to see that the set f V psq coincides with the closure of the set f N psq. We are now ready to define the Myopic Stable Set, abbreviated as MSS, for normal-form games.
Definition 3 (Myopic Stable Set (MSS)). Let G : pN, pS i q iN , pπ i q iN q be a normal-form game. The set M S is a myopic stable set (MSS) if it is closed and satisfies the following three conditions:
There is no closed set M I M that satisfies Conditions 1 and 2.
Let M be a MSS. Deterrence of external deviations requires that no player can profitably deviate to a strategy profile outside M . Asymptotic external stability requires that any strategy profile outside M is asymptotically dominated by a strategy profile in M . Hence, from any strategy profile outside of M it is possible to get arbitrary close to a strategy profile in M by a finite number of dominations. Observe that an empty set would necessarily violate asymptotic external stability, so it follows that M is non-empty.
Bertrand Duopoly with Asymmetric Costs
Consider a model with two firms, N t1, 2u, having constant marginal costs 0 ¤ c 1 c 2 and no fixed costs. The strategy space P i of a firm i N consists of all non-negative prices, i.e., P i r0, Vq. Define P : P 1 ¢ P 2 with typical element p.
The continuous market demand function D : r0, Vq ÝÑ R expresses the demand for the good as a function of the lowest price p m available in the market. There exists a "choke" price p m pc 2 , Vq such that Dpp m q 0 for all p m ¥ p m . The demand is strictly decreasing on r0, p m s and zero on rp m , Vq. We assume that there is an ε ¡ 0 such that the profits pp m ¡ c 1 qDpp m q of a monopolist with marginal costs c 1 are strictly increasing in p m on the domain rc 1 , c 2 εs. This assumption ensures an element of competition between the firms. If the profits of the monopolist with marginal costs c 1 has a maximum for a price in rc 1 , c 2 q, then the strategy profiles in which Firm 1 chooses this price and Firm 2 chooses a strictly higher price are Nash equilibria and part of the MSS.
For each firm i t1, 2u, its individual demand depends on its price p i and the price of its competitor j $ i and is given by:
Thus, the firm setting the lower price serves the entire market. In case of a tie, the market share of each firm equals 1{2. For each firm i t1, 2u, the demand Q i pp i , p j q leads to a payoff function π i :
The normal-form game pt1, 2u, pP i q it1,2u , pπ i q it1,2u q is denoted by Γ.
No Legal Restrictions
The next result characterizes the unique MSS of the game. The set is illustrated as the shaded area in the left panel of Figure 1 .
Proposition 4. The unique MSS of Γ is given by:
Proof. Let M be an MSS.
Step 1. P
Towards a contradiction, suppose that pp 1 , p 2 q P satisfies c 1 p 1 p 2 c 2 and pp 1 , p 2 q is not in M . Once the contradiction is obtained, we get the result of Step 1 exploiting the fact that M is closed.
Take some p I 1 pc 1 , p 1 q and suppose that pp I 1 , p 2 q M . Given that pp 1 , p 2 q M and M is closed, there is an ε I ¡ 0 such that for every ε p0, ε I q we have pp 1 ¡ ε, p 2 q M . However, for every ε p0, ε I q, as the profits of a monopolist with marginal costs c 1 are strictly increasing on the domain rc 1 , c 2 s, Firm 1 will find it profitable to deviate to p 1 ¡ ε ¡ p I . Since M satisfies deterrence of external deviations, it follows that pp 1 ¡ ε, p 2 q M , leading to a contradiction. Consequently, it follows that for every
Take some p I 1 pc 1 , p 1 q such that π 1 pp I 1 , p 2 q ¡ π 1 pp 1 , p 2 q{2. It holds by the conclusion of the previous paragraph that pp I 1 , p 2 q M. By asymptotic external stability, there must be pp P
Note that any profitable deviation of Firm 1 from pp I 1 , p 2 q is to a strategy profile pp 1 , p 2 q such thatp 1 pp I 1 , p 1 q. In any of these profiles, Firm 2 makes no sales and has no profitable deviation. Since none of these profiles is in M , by asymptotic external stability it holds that pp 1 , p 2 q M , a contradiction.
Step 2. P 2 tp P |c 1 ¤ p 1 ¤ c 2 , p 1 ¤ p 2 u M. Take pp 1 , p 2 q P 1 such that p 2 c 2 . It follows from Step 1 that pp 1 , p 2 q M. It holds that π 2 pp 1 , p 2 q is strictly negative. As such, Firm 2 can gain by increasing p 2 to any value above p 1 resulting in a profit of zero. By deterrence of external deviations, all of these options must also be in M. The result of Step 2 now follows from the requirement that M is closed.
Step 3. P Step 4 follows by deterrence of external deviations and closedness of M .
Step 5. P 2 P 3 P 4 P ¦ is the unique MSS.
First, observe that P ¦ is closed. We have shown that P ¦ is contained in any MSS, so we only need to show that P ¦ itself satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability. The set P zP ¦ is given by
In order to see that P ¦ satisfies deterrence of external deviations, note that Firm 1 makes non-negative profits at any strategy profile in P ¦ and non-positive profits at any profile in P zP ¦ . Thus, Firm 1 will never deviate from a strategy profile in P ¦ to a strategy profile in P zP ¦ . Next, Firm 2 cannot deviate to any strategy profile in P 5 P 7 from any strategy profile in P ¦ . Finally, at any strategy profile in P 6 , Firm 2 has negative profits. Firm 2 only obtains negative profits at strategy profiles in P ¦ if p 1 p 2 c 2 . In these cases, if Firm 2 deviates to a profile in P 6 by choosing p I 2 p 1 , its profits decrease. Thus, Firm 2 will not make such a deviation.
It remains to be shown that P ¦ satisfies asymptotic external stability. At any strategy profile in P 5 , Firm 1 has a negative profit and the deviation to pc 1 , p 2 q is thus profitable for Firm 1. If p 2 ¥ c 1 then pc 1 , p 2 q P ¦ , otherwise Firm 2 can gain by deviating to pc 1 , c 2 q P ¦ . In P 6 , Firm 2 has a negative profit and the deviation to pp 1 , c 2 q is profitable for Firm 2. If p 1 ¥ c 1 then pp 1 , c 2 q P ¦ . Otherwise, there exists a profitable deviation of Firm 1 to pc 1 , c 2 q P ¦ . In P 7 , Firm 1 has a profit of at most zero. Thus, the deviation to the profile ppc 1 c 2 q{2, p 2 q P ¦ is profitable for Firm 1. 
Legal Restrictions on Predatory Pricing
Let us now consider a slightly different version of Bertrand competition. In many countries, pricing below marginal or average cost is considered to be predatory pricing and is thus forbidden by law. We analyze how this restriction influences the MSS. To do so, we adjust the sets of strategies and definẽ
The absence of predatory pricing is similar to the requirement of undominated strategies in Kartik (2011) . The only difference is that pricing at marginal costs is allowed in our setting, while it is ruled out in Kartik (2011) . The normal-form game pt1, 2u, pP i q it1,2u , pπ i q it1,2u q is denoted byΓ.
The following proposition shows that the MSS gets much smaller under legal restrictions on predatory pricing. Let p 1 pc 1 , c 2 q be the uniquely determined price such that π 1 pp 1 , c 2 q π 1 pc 2 , c 2 q.
Proposition 5. The unique MSS ofΓ is given bỹ
Proof. We split the proof into several steps.
Step 1. We show thatP ¦ satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability. We start with deterrence of external deviations. For pp 1 , c 2 q P ¦ , profits of Step 2. Let M P ¦ be a set satisfying deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability. Let us show that for every p 1 rp 1 , c 2 q it holds that pp 1 , c 2 q M implies pc 2 , c 2 q M. Suppose pp 1 , c 2 q M and pc 2 , c 2 q M . By closedness of M , there is ε I ¡ 0 such that, for every ε p0, ε I q, pc 2 ¡ε, c 2 q M . Take p I 1 maxtpp 1 c 2 q{2, c 2 ¡ ε I {2u, then pp I 1 , c 2 q f pp 1 , c 2 q, so pp I 1 , c 2 q M . Given that p I 1 ¡ c 2 ¡ ε I , we obtain a contradiction.
Step 3. Let M P ¦ be a set satisfying deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability. Let us show that if pc 2 , c 2 q M , then, for every p 1 rp 1 , c 2 q, we have pp 1 , c 2 q M . This follows from the fact that, for every p 1 pp 1 , c 2 q, π 1 pp 1 , c 2 q ¡ π 1 pc 2 , c 2 q and the fact that M is closed.
Step 4. We are now ready to show thatP ¦ is an MSS. First of all, by
Step 1 it satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability. So ifP ¦ is not an MSS, it should violate minimality. This means that there is a proper subset M ofP ¦ that also satisfies deterrence of external deviations and asymptotic external stability.
The set M either contains pc 2 , c 2 q or it is a subset of rp 1 , c 2 q ¢ tc 2 u. If M contains pc 2 , c 2 q then, by Step 3, it should contain rp 1 , c 2 q ¢ tc 2 u and therefore be equal toP ¦ , a contradiction with M being a proper subset ofP ¦ . If M is a subset ofP ¦ ztpc 2 , c 2 qu, then by Step 2, it should contain pc 2 , c 2 q, a contradiction.
Step 5. Finally we show thatP ¦ is the unique MSS. Let M be an MSS. We show thatP ¦ M $ r. Towards a contradiction, suppose thatP ¦ M r. Then, for all p I P ¦ , there is p P M such that p P f V pp I q. Given thatP ¦ is closed and p P P ¦ , there is ε ¡ 0 such that B ε pp P qP ¦ r, where B ε pp P q tp P | dpp, p P q εu. By definition of f V , there is k N and p P such that p f k pp I q and p B ε pp P q. By a k-fold application of deterrence of external deviations, it holds that p P ¦ , so p B ε pp P q P ¦ and we have obtained a contradiction. Consequently, it holds thatP ¦ M $ r.
Step 6. If M contains pc 2 , c 2 q, then, by Step 3, M should also containP ¦ ztpc 2 , c 2 qu, soP ¦ M and by minimalityP ¦ M . If M contains an element ofP ¦ ztpc 2 , c 2 qu, then, by
Step 2, it should also contain pc 2 , c 2 q and, by
Step 3, alsoP ¦ ztpc 2 , c 2 qu. Again, we obtaiñ P ¦ M and by minimalityP ¦ M .
Discussion
We have provided a complete characterization of the Myopic Stable Set for two versions of the Bertrand duopoly with asymmetric marginal costs. Despite the popularity of Bertrand competition, the set of Nash equilibria has not been fully characterized and, without a restriction to undominated strategies, even no equivalence of equilibrium payoffs has been established. For our solution concept, we obtain a unique set-valued prediction both when predatory pricing is allowed and when it is forbidden by law. A clean solution to a game with such a complex set of Nash equilibria boosts the appeal of the Myopic Stable Set.
Another implication of our results is that when predatory pricing is forbidden, the market price is predicted to be weakly lower than in Nash equilibria in undominated strategies.
